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Who is John Doe and Why Do We Care?: Why a 
Uniform Approach to Dealing with John Doe 
Defamation Cases is Needed 
Craig Buske* 
John Doe may be the most wanted person in cyberspace. Corporations 
everywhere . . . are tracking him down in lawsuits that allege sins 
ranging from interference with business relationships to defamation 
to breach of fiduciary duty.1 
 
This kind of case—in which a plaintiff seeks to identify a defendant 
for purposes of serving process—poses a substantial challenge for 
courts because they are called upon at the very outset of the case to 
make the critical, and often outcome-determinative, decision whether 
to permit discovery of the defendant’s identity.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Courts have utilized a variety of standards in determining 
whether to allow a plaintiff to discover the identity of an 
anonymous defendant. Many of the standards currently 
utilized are contradictory, and oftentimes poorly explained. 
This Note seeks to guide the reader through the quagmire of 
existing standards, and to recommend a uniform approach to 
this issue that finds common ground in satisfying the various 
concerns of the courts. 
                                                          
 2010 Craig Buske. 
* Craig Buske is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School. 
 1. Steve Woodward, Three Corporations Go to Court to Fight Internet 
Falsehoods, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at B5. 
 2. Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case 
Against Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 Or. L. Rev. 795, 
799 (2004). 
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II.  THE PROBLEM OF JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS AND 
HOW COURTS HAVE TRIED TO FASHION REMEDIES 
A.  THE RIGHT TO ANONYMOUS SPEECH 
Most Americans are familiar with the right to free speech 
derived from the First Amendment. If the average American 
were asked what the right to free speech meant to him, he 
would likely answer something about the freedom of the press 
or the right to criticize our government. However, the average 
layperson may not be familiar with the concept of the right to 
anonymous speech. 
The right to anonymous speech is largely a development of 
modern jurisprudence, and its beginnings are found in Talley v. 
California.3 The case concerned a Los Angeles city ordinance 
that made it illegal to distribute any handbill that did not 
include information identifying the name and address of the 
person who created the publication.4 The petitioner in Talley 
was convicted of violating the ordinance when he distributed 
handbills urging people to boycott certain named businesses 
that engaged in racial discrimination in hiring. Petitioner 
argued that the ordinance “invaded his freedom of speech and 
press in violation of the Fourteenth and First 
Amendments . . . .”5 The Court agreed, discussing the 
important role anonymous literature has played in the 
“progress of mankind” and invalidating the ordinance on the 
grounds that “[t]here can be no doubt that such an 
identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to 
distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.”6 
Although the Court’s opinion in Talley falls short of 
proclaiming that “there is a right to anonymous speech under 
the First Amendment,” the opinion has been used as a basis for 
that conclusion.7 
                                                          
 3. 362 U.S. 60 (1960) 
 4. Id. at 60. 
 5. Id. at 62. 
 6. Id. at 64. One of the most noteworthy examples of anonymous 
literature that “played an important role in the progress of mankind” is the 
Federalist Papers. See id. at 64–65. 
 7. For examples of cases that cite Talley in finding a right to anonymous 
speech, see Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 
536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 
334 (1995). 
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Following Talley, jurisprudence regarding the right to 
anonymous speech lay dormant, at least as far as the Supreme 
Court was concerned, until it granted certiorari in McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Commission thirty-five years later.8 The subject 
matter of McIntyre was nearly identical to that of Talley in that 
a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous literature was 
challenged as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.9 
The Court in McIntyre defended the decision in Talley, holding 
that “an author’s decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect 
of freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”10 As 
in Talley, one of the Court’s rationales was the important role 
anonymous publications have played in the advancement of 
American society, referring again to the Federalist Papers, but 
also citing examples such as novels by Mark Twain (Samuel 
Clemens) and O. Henry (William Sydney Porter).11 
The Supreme Court relied on the right to anonymous 
speech two more times in the subsequent decade to strike down 
laws that required the identification of anonymous speakers. In 
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, the Court 
invalidated a Colorado law that required anyone circulating a 
petition in favor of putting a particular initiative or issue on an 
election ballot to wear a badge that included their name, 
holding that “Colorado’s current badge requirement 
discourages participation in the petition circulation process by 
forcing name identification without sufficient cause.”12 
Similarly, in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, 
Inc. v. Village of Stratton, the Court struck down a village 
ordinance requiring anyone who wanted to go door-to-door to 
promote any cause to obtain a permit first.13 Part of the Court’s 
opposition to the permit requirement was that it required all 
                                                          
 8. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 9. Id. at 336. The statute in McIntyre was different from the ordinance in 
Talley only in that the McIntyre statute only prohibited distribution of 
anonymous campaign literature, and not all anonymous literature. While the 
Court in McIntyre acknowledged this fact and conceded that because of that 
difference Talley does not automatically control, the distinction was not 
enough to justify a different result. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344, 357. 
 10. Id. at 342. 
 11. Id. at 341–43. 
 12. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200 
(1999). 
 13. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 
U.S. 150, 168–69 (2002). 
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canvassers, solicitors, and peddlers to carry the permit with 
them when they went door-to-door and display it if requested 
by a police officer or resident.14 The Court concluded that these 
requirements resulted in “a surrender of [the canvasser’s] 
anonymity,” and as such, “the ordinance may preclude such 
persons from canvassing for unpopular causes.”15 
The four cases discussed above—Talley, McIntyre, Buckley 
and Watchtower—form the foundation for the “well-established 
First Amendment right to speak anonymously.”16 Although 
these cases all dealt primarily with printed materials, the 
principles elucidated in those opinions have, without reserve, 
been interpreted to apply not only to the physical distribution 
of literature, but to the Internet as well.17 
B.  HOW COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS IN 
THE PAST 
Several competing standards have emerged to deal with 
the problem of anonymous, or John Doe, defendants in 
defamation cases. As the court noted in Doe v. Cahill, there is 
an entire spectrum of ‘standards’ that could be required, ranging (in 
ascending order) from a good faith basis to assert a claim, to pleading 
sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, to a showing of prima 
facie evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment, and beyond that, hurdles even more stringent.18 
In order to understand the current confusion regarding the 
correct standard in a John Doe defamation case, a review of the 
chronological progression of these standards is necessary. 
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com was one of the first 
cases to analyze the competing interests of plaintiffs seeking 
discovery of anonymous defendants and the “legitimate and 
valuable right to participate in online forums anonymously.”19 
                                                          
 14. Id. at 155, 166. 
 15. Id. at 166–67. 
 16. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001). 
 17. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (stating that there is “no 
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be 
applied to [the Internet]”); Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1097 
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (“[T]he constitutional rights of Internet users, including 
the First Amendment right to speak anonymously, must be carefully 
safeguarded.”). 
 18. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005). 
 19. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 
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Columbia Insurance Company filed suit in the Northern 
District of California on behalf of See’s Candy Shops seeking 
injunctive relief because a different entity had registered the 
domain names www.seescandy.com and www.seecandys.com.20 
An impasse arose when the court determined it could not grant 
injunctive relief until the defendants had been served with the 
complaint.21 However, the defendant could not be served with 
the complaint because his identity was unclear as the domain 
names had been registered online under potentially fictitious 
names.22 The specific issue before the court was whether to 
allow discovery before the defendant had been made a party to 
the suit.23 The court adopted the following safeguards to limit 
the situations in which discovery could take place before the 
defendant was a party to the suit: 
 
 “First, the plaintiff should identify the missing party 
with sufficient specificity such that the Court can 
determine that defendant is a real person or entity who 
could be sued in federal court.”24 
 “Second, the party should identify all previous steps 
taken to locate the elusive defendant.”25 
 “Third, plaintiff should establish to the Court’s 
satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit against defendant could 
withstand a motion to dismiss.”26 
 Fourth, the “plaintiff should file a request for discovery 
with the Court” including justification for the specific 
discovery requested and “identification of a limited 
number of persons” on whom discovery could be served 
that will produce a “reasonable likelihood” of identifying 
the defendant.27 
 
One year later a Virginia court used a simpler standard in 
                                                          
1999). 
 20. Id. at 575. 
 21. Id. at 577. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 578. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 579. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 580. 
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In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.28 In that 
case, the plaintiff sought to compel America Online (AOL) to 
provide the identities of four subscribers allegedly engaged in 
defamation.29 A subpoena was issued to AOL, who 
subsequently filed a Motion to Quash.30 In denying the Motion 
to Quash, the court held that a non-party Internet service 
provider (ISP) should only be ordered to identify a subscriber or 
user if “the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, 
good faith basis” for bringing suit and “the subpoenaed identity 
information is centrally needed to advance that claim.”31 The 
requirement of a “good faith basis” adopted in this case is 
considered one of the lowest standards required before 
unmasking an anonymous defendant.32 
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe represents the next 
important development in John Doe defamation cases.33 The 
facts were similar to those in America Online. Dendrite 
International, Inc. (Dendrite) brought a defamation claim 
against various John Doe defendants and sought expedited 
discovery to identify the defendants.34 In Dendrite, the John 
Doe defendants had posted messages on a Yahoo! bulletin 
board dedicated to matters related to Dendrite.35 Specifically, 
the anonymous posters accused Dendrite of restructuring its 
accounting practices in a way that would cause the company’s 
annual earnings to appear to increase, but without any 
accompanying increase in the number of sales.36 The New 
Jersey court, in denying Dendrite’s interlocutory appeal, 
offered a four-step set of guidelines for trial courts to use when 
“striking a balance between the well-established First 
Amendment right to speak anonymously, and the right of the 
plaintiff to protect its proprietary interests and 
                                                          
 28. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 
WL 1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 
2001). 
 29. Id. at *1. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at *8. 
 32. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005). 
 33. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001). 
 34. Id. at 760. 
 35. Id. at 762. 
 36. Id. 
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reputation . . . .”37 First, the plaintiff must try to notify the 
anonymous posters by placing a notice regarding the identity 
discovery request on the same message board where the 
allegedly defamatory material appeared.38 Second, the plaintiff 
must identify the exact statements made that allegedly 
constitute actionable speech.39 Third, the plaintiff must 
establish that its action can withstand a motion to dismiss and 
must produce sufficient prima facie evidence to support each 
element of its cause of action.40 Finally, the “court must balance 
the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free 
speech against the strength of the prima facie case 
presented . . . .”41 The notification required by the court in 
Dendrite is an important aspect of these guidelines. The most 
important provision, however, is the third step—the ability to 
withstand a motion to dismiss coupled with sufficient evidence 
supporting each element of the claim. As the law develops, this 
third step will be the subject of much debate.42 
The next important case that addresses the issue of 
identifying defendants in John Doe cases is Doe v. Cahill.43 As 
the only state supreme court case to deal specifically with the 
issue of John Doe defendants in defamation suits arising in the 
context of the Internet, Cahill is the highest appellate court 
opinion addressing the subject.44 Cahill involved a situation 
that should be familiar by now: comments are posted on an 
online forum; the subject of those comments doesn’t like them; 
the subject subsequently sues for defamation.45 The plaintiffs 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 760. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. The main point of disagreement regarding standards in John Doe 
defamation cases centers on the quantum of proof required before a plaintiff is 
allowed to discover an anonymous defendant’s identity. Different standards 
are adopted by the courts in nearly every John Doe defamation case discussed 
in this Note. 
 43. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
 44. Although the Wisconsin State Supreme Court dealt with a similar 
subject in Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006), that suit did not 
arise in the context of the Internet, but as a discovery dispute over whether 
the identities of unknown members of a political organization had to be 
disclosed. 
 45. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454. 
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in the case were Patrick and Julia Cahill.46 Mr. and Mrs. Cahill 
were residents of Smyrna, Delaware, and brought suit in 
response to anonymous messages posted on a website hosted by 
the Delaware State News.47 An anonymous online poster using 
the alias “Proud Citizen” criticized Patrick Cahill’s performance 
as a City Councilman and made other disparaging statements 
about Mr. Cahill as well, alleging that he was paranoid and 
that he was suffering from “an obvious mental deterioration.”48 
Mr. Cahill understandably took issue with those statements, 
and he and his wife filed suit on November 2, 2004.49 On June 
14, 2005, the Delaware Superior Court applied a “good faith” 
standard in deciding to compel disclosure of the John Doe 
defendant’s identity and ordered the anonymous defendant’s 
Internet Service Provider to disclose his identity.50 John Doe 
filed an interlocutory appeal, which was accepted by the 
Supreme Court of Delaware.51 
The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court of Delaware 
was whether the “good faith” standard applied by the trial 
judge was the correct legal standard.52 In deciding that issue, 
Cahill explicitly referenced the guidelines set forth in Dendrite, 
but offered some criticisms of that standard and modified it in a 
few ways. First, the court adopted the notification provision of 
the Dendrite guidelines.53 However, that was the only step of 
the test the court specifically adopted. Cahill instead 
recharacterized the third step of Dendrite, that the plaintiff 
must establish that its action can withstand a motion to 
dismiss and must produce sufficient prima facie evidence to 
support each element of its cause of action, as a “summary 
judgment standard.”54 Although the Dendrite opinion never 
used the words “summary judgment,” Cahill simply substituted 
the summary judgment standard for the Dendrite language and 
purported to follow the third prong of Dendrite.55 If this 
                                                          
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 455. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 460. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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approach seems confusing, it should, because it has caused 
confusion among courts and scholars ever since the opinion was 
published. With regard to the rest of the test from Dendrite, the 
court in Cahill dismissed the second and fourth steps as 
unnecessary.56 The court found the second step subsumed by 
the summary judgment standard.57 Similarly, the Cahill court 
stated that balancing “the defendant’s First Amendment rights 
against the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case is also 
unnecessary,” because the “summary judgment test is itself the 
balance.”58 
Two years after Cahill, the issue of what standard to apply 
when deciding to unmask a John Doe defendant was again 
before an appellate court, although not in a defamation suit. In 
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, an Arizona court was faced with a 
plaintiff who wanted to discover the identity of an anonymous 
entity that allegedly accessed certain information on Mobilisa’s 
protected computer systems illegally and then sent the 
information to various Mobilisa employees via e-mail.59 
Although the court in Mobilisa said it agreed with the two 
steps adopted in Cahill, notification and surviving a summary 
judgment motion, it disagreed “with [the Cahill] court’s 
conclusion that a balancing step is unnecessary.”60 The 
Mobilisa opinion recognizes that there will likely be a “vast 
array” of cases that involve anonymous speech, and that these 
cases will be factually distinct.61 Including a balancing test will 
allow the court to consider factors that might weigh against 
disclosure of an anonymous defendant’s identity that are not 
taken into account by a summary judgment standard, such as 
whether the anonymous speaker is a non-party witness, what 
type of speech was involved, and what kind of expectation of 
privacy the speaker had.62 Subsequently, the Mobilisa decision 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 461. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 715–16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
 60. Id. at 720. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. With regard to what type of speech is at issue, the court points out 
that political expression is afforded the most protection by the First 
Amendment, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995), 
while commercial speech is less protected than other forms of speech, Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
562–63 (1980). 
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revitalized the balancing test deleted from the Dendrite test by 
Cahill. 
The Texas Court of Appeals reiterated the absence of a 
consensus regarding whether courts must balance a plaintiff’s 
right to pursue her case against an anonymous defendant’s 
rights under the First Amendment in In re Does 1-10.63 Less 
than a month after the court in Mobilisa decided that a 
balancing test was necessary to adequately protect anonymous 
plaintiffs, the Texas Court of Appeals adopted only the second 
prong of the test from Cahill, while disregarding the 
notification provision and declining to add a balancing test.64 
Following the decision in In re Does 1-10, there continues 
to be disagreement regarding the inclusion of a notification step 
and the necessity of a balancing test. A consensus had emerged, 
however, around the summary judgment standard from Cahill. 
A California decision in Krinsky v. Doe upset that emerging 
consensus.65 Krinsky first pointed out the shortcomings of the 
notification requirement from Dendrite and Cahill, specifically 
the requirement that plaintiff post a notice of the discovery 
request in the same place the allegedly defamatory comments 
were originally made: “[A]n Internet Web site, chat room, or 
message board may no longer exist or be active by the time the 
plaintiff brings suit; consequently, it would be unrealistic and 
unprofitable” to insist a plaintiff follow the notice requirement 
from Dendrite and Cahill.66 Criticisms aside, the court in 
Krinsky conceded the notification requirement was not unduly 
burdensome.67 These two positions leave the reader, and other 
courts, unclear about where the court in Krinsky stands on the 
notification provision. With regard to the summary judgment 
standard, the court “f[ound] it unnecessary and potentially 
confusing to attach a procedural label, whether summary 
judgment or motion to dismiss, to the showing required of a 
plaintiff seeking the identity of an anonymous speaker . . . .”68 
Instead, the court decided a plaintiff must make a prima facie 
showing of the elements of their case.69 Finally, concerning the 
                                                          
 63. In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). 
 64. Id. at 821–22. 
 65. Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 66. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 244. 
 69. Id. at 245. The context of the Krinsky opinion is slightly limited 
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use of a balancing test, the Krinsky opinion concluded it was 
unnecessary to balance the interests of the competing parties, 
at least in a defamation case, because “[w]hen there is a factual 
and legal basis for believing libel may have occurred, the 
writer’s message will not be protected by the First 
Amendment.”70 
In summary, when deciding whether to allow a plaintiff to 
discover the identity of an anonymous defendant, some courts 
have required the defendant be given notice and others have 
not.71 Some courts have required the defendant’s First 
Amendment rights be balanced against the strength of the 
plaintiff’s case, and some have held that step to be 
unnecessary.72 The quantum of proof the courts deem necessary 
in pleading a case ranges “from placing an extremely light 
burden (indeed, virtually no burden at all) on the plaintiff, to 
requiring the plaintiff to tender proof of its allegations that 
would survive a summary judgment, or even more stringent 
requirements.”73 It is out of this confusing state of contradictory 
and competing standards that this Note attempts to reconcile 
the competing interests and recommend a single standard that 
may bring uniformity to the issue. 
III.  A UNIFORM APPROACH IS NEEDED 
It is well known that different states have different 
common law. This fact is the inevitable result of a judicial 
system in which thousands of judges across the country try to 
find equitable dispositions to the problems created by difficult 
cases. In many instances, these differences in law may not 
present insurmountable problems, and the courts are able to 
administer effective justice. Some areas of the law, however, 
suffer from a lack of uniformity. John Doe defamation cases are 
                                                          
because it is addressing the specific question of what standard should be 
applied when the plaintiff’s cause of action is for libel and when the defendant 
has already filed a Motion to Quash a subpoena seeking to obtain the identity 
of the defendant. However, I believe the principles the case was decided upon 
may be extrapolated to a slightly broader context without distorting the 
court’s reasoning. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Compare Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005), and Dendrite 
Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), 
with Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244. 
 72. Compare Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61, with Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461. 
 73. In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). 
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one such area. A new approach to John Doe defamation cases is 
needed because “existing law lacks nimble ways to resolve 
disputes about speech and privacy on the Internet.”74 
The fact that Constitutional rights are at stake in these 
cases is one of the reasons they should be closely scrutinized. 
The confusing array of competing standards currently being 
adopted across the country creates problems unique to John 
Doe defamation cases. Most of the defamation suits that raise 
problems regarding the anonymity of the defendant arise in the 
context of the Internet which raises the potential for 
jurisdictional problems. Unlike libelous statements published 
in a newspaper that only circulates in a particular geographic 
area, anything posted on the Internet is easily accessible to 
anyone in the United States with an internet connection, and 
as such, the defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction 
in any state in America.75 As such, if standards for unmasking 
a defendant are easier to meet in some jurisdictions than 
others, a plaintiff in a John Doe defamation case will have 
significant incentive to forum shop. This encouragement of 
forum shopping is particularly troubling in light of the fact that 
many plaintiffs in John Doe defamation cases are not actually 
seeking a monetary reward, but rather more of a symbolic 
victory.76 In many instances, simply unmasking a John Doe 
defendant for the purposes of shaming them may be enough to 
satisfy the plaintiff.77 If this scenario unfolds as speculated 
above, the plaintiff may be able to obtain the relief they want in 
violation of the defendant’s First Amendment rights, and the 
defendant will be left without recourse. 
The considerable confusion among different jurisdictions is 
                                                          
 74. Daniel J. Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in 
the Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REV 1195, 1199 (2006). 
 75. Personal jurisdiction for activity that takes place over the Internet is a 
somewhat uncertain field. However, Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984), 
suggests that in situations where defendants purposefully engaged in the tort 
of defamation (libel, more specifically, in Calder) and their actions were 
calculated to cause harm to a victim they knew to be residing in particular 
state, that personal jurisdiction in the victim’s home state is appropriate. See 
David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 
553 (1991) for a discussion of how libel law in general is a field in which a 
defendant may be subject to the laws of more than one state. 
 76. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse 
in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 860, 872 (2000). 
 77. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005) (unmasking an 
anonymous defendant affords a plaintiff an important form of relief). 
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another reason to adopt uniform standards. Courts in different 
jurisdictions disagree on issues frequently. However, there is a 
difference between disagreement and confusion. Lower courts 
that have to deal with the questions presented in John Doe 
defamation cases are not merely following the decisions made 
by the appellate courts in their jurisdiction, resulting in the 
application of two or three competing standards. Instead, lower 
courts are left without clear guidelines. Rather than having two 
competing standards between federal circuits, each jurisdiction 
in the country is utilizing different standards. The confusion 
that results from having a myriad of different standards is 
considerably greater than that created by having two 
competing standards. 
Another argument in favor of establishing a uniform 
standard is that it will be more cost effective and efficient. 
Many commentators are concerned that free speech on the 
Internet will be chilled by fear of litigation and identification.78 
The more complex the problem presented in litigation, the more 
time and expense it will take to find a solution. As such, if 
there were a uniform standard for dealing with John Doe 
defamation cases, litigation expenses for such cases would 
likely decrease and the chilling effect that defamation suits 
have on free speech may be somewhat ameliorated. 
The above paragraphs all point to the need for a uniform 
approach to John Doe defamation cases. As David Anderson 
remarked, “[l]ibel is a field that cries out for some 
uniformity.”79 That sentiment translates wholly to defamation 
in general, particularly in the context of the Internet. Based on 
the First Amendment rights at issue in John Doe defamation 
cases; the potential for jurisdictional problems and forum 
shopping; the existing confusion regarding this area of the law; 
and the potential for saving litigants, as well as the court 
system, time and money, a uniform system for dealing with 
John Doe defendants should be adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
IV.  THE APPROACH THAT COURTS SHOULD TAKE FOR 
JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 
As demonstrated above by section II-B, courts across the 
                                                          
 78. Id. at 457; Lidsky, supra note 76, at 861. 
 79. Anderson, supra note 75, at 553. 
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country have chosen to deal with the problem of John Doe 
defendants in many different ways. This section analyzes and 
critiques the various approaches taken, and suggests a course 
of action for each potential element of the test to decide 
whether a court should unmask an anonymous defendant. 
A.  WHY A NOTIFICATION PROVISION IS NEEDED 
In many instances when someone is trying to identify an 
anonymous defendant, the defendant will learn about it, either 
from their Internet Service Provider (ISP), or through a third 
party. However, many ISPs may not notify a subscriber if they 
are served with a court order to divulge that subscriber’s 
identity.80 Steps have been taken to prevent this from 
happening, but there is no guarantee that an Internet 
subscriber will be notified before their identity is divulged.81 
However, when a “provision imposes very little burden on a 
defamation plaintiff while at the same time giving an 
anonymous defendant the opportunity to respond,”82 and the 
defendant’s “First Amendment interests are at stake,”83 a 
balancing of the competing parties’ interests favors including a 
notification provision. As a general principle, “[a] court should 
not consider impacting a speaker’s First Amendment rights 
without affording the speaker an opportunity to respond to the 
discovery request.”84 
Although notification of a defendant is important, any 
notification provision adopted should not be absolute. In the 
past, some courts have required the plaintiff to notify the 
defendant by placing a notification in the same place where the 
allegedly defamatory material was posted.85 The problem with 
this requirement is that, due to the fluid and impermanent 
nature of the Internet, the website where the allegedly 
                                                          
 80. Vogel, supra note 2, at 802–03 (stating that in the 1990s, many ISPs 
would produce the information requested in subpoenas without allowing their 
subscriber to object or seek judicial intervention). 
 81. For example, 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1) prohibits a cable internet service 
provider from disclosing “personally identifiable information,” even pursuant 
to a court order, unless the subscriber is first given notice. 
 82. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
 85. See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. 
Super Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
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defamatory material was posted may no longer exist by the 
time a suit is brought.86 Given this challenge, there should not 
be an absolute requirement that an anonymous defendant be 
notified before their identity is disclosed. However, the plaintiff 
should be required to make a good faith effort to notify the 
defendant, whether by posting on the same board where the 
material originally appeared or through some other means, 
before discovery of the defendant’s identity is allowed.87 
B.  A REQUIREMENT THAT THE EXACT STATEMENTS IN QUESTION 
BE STATED SHOULD BE INCLUDED 
The requirement found in Dendrite that the court “require 
the plaintiff to identify and set forth the exact statements 
purportedly made by each anonymous poster that plaintiff 
alleges constitutes actionable speech,” is an important 
requirement.88 Although the court in Cahill may be correct in 
saying that requiring the exact statements to be set forth is 
unnecessary if a summary judgment standard is being 
utilized,89 there are potential problems presented by this step’s 
absence. First, because this Note is not advocating a summary 
judgment standard, it makes sense to retain the requirement 
that the exact statements in question be set forth. Second, 
procedural motions may create unique difficulties as explained 
by the court in Krinsky: “[I]f a complaint is filed in a notice-
pleading state in which defamation claims are not excepted by 
statute or case law, the second Dendrite requirement (setting 
forth the statement with particularity) will be essential, while 
in Wisconsin it will be superfluous . . . .”90 The requirement 
that the statements in question be stated with particularity 
would be superfluous because Wisconsin “require[s] 
particularity in the pleading of defamation claims.”91 Although 
in some states requiring the plaintiff to set forth the exact 
statements that allegedly constitute defamation may be 
redundant or unnecessary, the benefits to be gained from the 
additional clarity provided, as well as the benefits to be realized 
                                                          
 86. Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 87. This requirement is, of course, moot if it has been established that the 
defendant already has notice that someone is seeking to learn his identity. 
 88. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760. 
 89. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005). 
 90. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244. 
 91. Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis. 2006). 
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from having a uniform law, outweigh any concerns about 
superfluous language.92 
C.  THE APPROPRIATE QUANTUM OF PROOF 
“The proper focus . . . [of John Doe defamation suits] 
should be on providing an injured party a means of redress 
without compromising the legitimate right of the Internet user 
to communicate freely with others.”93 Achieving this balance, 
however, is easier said than done. It is the position of this Note 
that the optimum quantum of proof is to require a plaintiff to 
make a prima facie case for all elements of defamation that are 
within the plaintiff’s control. Although requiring a plaintiff to 
make a prima facie case of all elements of a claim may seem 
like a high standard to impose at the discovery stage, it is 
necessary. The considerations that led to this conclusion are 
discussed below. 
1.  A High Standard is Needed to Adequately Protect First 
Amendment Rights 
As discussed above in section II-A, there is a well 
established right to engage in anonymous speech, and that 
right has been applied to the Internet without reserve.94 
Unfortunately, how to protect that right in John Doe 
defamation cases has not enjoyed a similar consensus, as 
evinced by the wide variety of standards adopted by different 
courts.95 
There are many reasons to insist on a high standard in 
John Doe defamation cases, one of them being the 
Constitutional importance that is placed on anonymous 
speech.96 The advantages to society in allowing anonymous 
speech outweigh the interests of plaintiffs in easily identifying 
                                                          
 92. In this author’s opinion, the law could benefit from a little redundancy 
if it made the law easier to understand. 
 93. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241. 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 3–17. 
 95. For a discussion of the wide range of standards adopted by different 
courts, see Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (2005). 
 96. Cases that emphasize the importance of the right to engage in 
anonymous speech include: Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., v. 
Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law 
Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 
(1995); and Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
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anonymous defendants.97 It is true that much of the “speech” on 
the Internet is not scholarly discourse.98 Anyone who has used 
the Internet recognizes that celebrity gossip and personal 
websites that bear more similarities to online diaries make up 
a large percentage of all websites.99 However, it is also true 
that, partially due to its anonymous nature, the Internet is a 
great equalizer, and as such it fulfills a very democratic 
function—it allows anyone with an Internet connection to voice 
their opinion on any matter, “however silly, profane, or brilliant 
[the idea] may be . . . .”100 Some commentators have even gone 
so far as to say that the Internet has had the greatest effect on 
a person’s ability to make their opinion heard since the 
invention of the printing press.101 The reason the Internet is 
such a great innovation in speech is because it “allows ordinary 
John Does to participate as never before in pnblic [sic] 
discourse, and hence, to shape public policy.”102 
However, the ability of the Internet to realize its potential 
for facilitating a marketplace of ideas will never occur if people 
do not use it for that purpose, and “[t]he free exchange of ideas 
on the Internet is driven in large part by the ability of Internet 
users to communicate anonymously.”103 The democratic nature 
of the Internet is what gives it value deserving of being 
protected by the First Amendment, and it is why a high level of 
protection should be afforded to speakers on the Internet. If the 
standard of proof is set too low, it may “chill potential posters 
                                                          
 97. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) 
(“The right to remain anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent 
conduct. But political speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable 
consequences, and, in general, our society accords greater weight to the value 
of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse.”) 
 98. Daniel J. Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in 
the Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REV 1195, 1196–97 (2006). 
 99. Id. According to one estimate, personal websites written by children 
and teenagers under the age of 19 account for over fifty percent of all blogs. G. 
Jeffrey Macdonald, Teens: It’s a Diary. Adults: It’s Unsafe, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, May 25, 2005, at 11. 
 100. Vogel, supra note 2, at 815 (quoting Brief for Public Citizen, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy Information Center as Amici 
Curiae at 5, Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003) (Nos. 50 WAP 2002 and 51 
WAP 2002)). 
 101. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: 
A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, 88 (2000). 
 102. Lidsky, supra note 76, at 861. 
 103. Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 
2001). 
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from exercising their First Amendment right to speak 
anonymously.”104 
Another reason to insist that plaintiffs meet a high 
evidentiary burden before being allowed to unmask an 
anonymous defendant is that there is evidence to suggest many 
defamation suits would not succeed if carried through to 
trial.105 In fact, only 13% of plaintiffs in a libel suit will 
ultimately prevail in libel litigation,106 and of those who do, 
they “owe more to good fortune than ‘to their virtue, their skill, 
or the justice of their cause.’”107 Because defendants are much 
more likely to succeed in defamation litigation than plaintiffs, 
courts should be particularly cautious in letting a suit proceed 
that will irreversibly destroy the defendant’s anonymity. 
Furthermore, by imposing a high standard on plaintiffs, courts 
are making it easier for legitimate plaintiffs to succeed at trial, 
because once “vigorous criticism descends into defamation . . . 
constitutional protection is no longer available,”108 and 
anonymous defendants will no longer be able to hide behind the 
First Amendment. 
2.  Why Standards Adopted in the Past Are Inadequate 
The lowest level of protection offered to anonymous 
defendants in defamation cases is the good faith standard 
imposed in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 
Inc.109 It seems clear that this standard is insufficient because, 
as the court remarked in Krinsky v. Doe, “[I]t offers no 
practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiff’s good faith 
and leaves the speaker with little protection.”110 The 
condemnation of the “good faith” test was best articulated, 
however, in Doe v. Cahill, which not only pointed out the test’s 
shortcomings but also raised the specter of some troubling 
                                                          
 104. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005). 
 105. Lidsky, supra note 76, at 875 (citing RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., 
LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS 3, 239–40 (1987)). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (quoting ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, 
AND RELATED PROBLEMS at xxix (2d ed. 1994)). 
 108. Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 109. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 
WL 1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 
2001). 
 110. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241. 
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consequences of applying such a lax standard, making it clear 
that a good faith standard offers too little protection for John 
Doe defendants: 
Plaintiffs can often initially plead sufficient facts to meet 
the good faith test . . . even if the defamation claim is not very 
strong, or worse, if they do not intend to pursue the defamation 
action to a final decision. After obtaining the identity of an 
anonymous critic through the compulsory discovery process, a 
defamation plaintiff who either loses on the merits or fails to 
pursue a lawsuit is still free to engage in extra-judicial self-help 
remedies; more bluntly, the plaintiff can simply seek revenge or 
retribution.111 
The next lowest quantum of proof that courts have 
required of plaintiffs to successfully unmask an anonymous 
defendant is requiring a plaintiff to bring a claim that could 
survive a motion to dismiss.112 In order to survive a motion to 
dismiss, all a plaintiff is required to do is include sufficient 
information to give “general notice of the claim asserted.”113 
This standard is also insufficient to protect an anonymous 
defendant’s First Amendment rights. Even if a claim is not 
meritorious or is unlikely to win, it may still survive a motion 
to dismiss. When weighing a right that is protected by the 
Constitution, simply requiring a plaintiff to assert a coherent 
legal claim is not a high enough threshold because “even silly 
or trivial libel claims can easily survive a motion to dismiss 
where the plaintiff pleads facts that put the defendant on 
notice of his claim, however vague or lacking in detail these 
allegations may be.”114 The opinion in Cahill went on to point 
out that if the motion to dismiss standard does not afford 
                                                          
 111. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005). 
 112. Although the words “motion to dismiss” were used in the standard 
promulgated by the court in Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 
760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), that was not exactly the standard 
adopted because in addition to being able to survive a motion to dismiss, the 
court also required a plaintiff to support each element of his cause of action 
with prima facie evidence. A motion to dismiss standard was also adopted by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 
(Wis. 2006), but again it was not a true motion to dismiss standard because in 
Wisconsin plaintiffs are required to plead defamation suits “with 
particularity.” Id. 
 113. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458 (quoting Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 
1034 (Del. 1998); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)). 
 114. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 459. 
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enough protection for anonymous defendants, then the good 
faith standard is also clearly insufficient.115 
The next standard utilized by courts in an attempt to 
protect First Amendment rights of anonymous defendants is 
the summary judgment standard.116 The summary judgment 
standard suffers from a different problem than the standards 
that have already been discussed. Rather than failing to 
provide enough protection to anonymous defendants, the 
summary judgment standard lacks the clarity that is needed 
for a well formulated quantum of proof. In applying the 
summary judgment standard to John Doe defamation cases, 
the court acts as if the anonymous party has made a motion for 
summary judgment, and decides whether the plaintiff would 
survive that motion.117 If the plaintiff can survive a motion for 
summary judgment they are allowed to discover the 
defendant’s identity. To succeed in learning the identity of an 
anonymous defendant under a summary judgment standard, a 
plaintiff would have to show that, based on the pleadings, the 
discovery material currently before the court, and any 
affidavits, there is a genuine issue as to a material fact of the 
plaintiff’s defamation claim.118 This does not mean merely the 
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the 
parties.119 To survive the summary judgment step, a plaintiff 
would have to show that there is a genuine dispute over some 
fact or facts that could affect the outcome of the case.120 
This practice of attaching a procedural label, while perhaps 
constituting a high enough hurdle that it adequately protects 
the defendant’s anonymity, is “unnecessary and potentially 
confusing.”121 The principal complaint about utilizing this kind 
                                                          
 115. Id. 
 116. The standard required plaintiffs to include as much information in 
their motion to compel discovery of an anonymous defendant’s identity as 
would be necessary to survive a motion for summary judgment. The Cahill 
court used it, 884 A.2d at 460–61, and claimed it originated in Dendrite Int’l, 
Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), even though 
the Dendrite court never explicitly used those terms. 
 117. See, e.g. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460. 
 118. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). 
 119. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). This 
shortcoming of the summary judgment standard also applies to the motion to 
dismiss standard. 
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of procedural language is that it results in a standard that does 
not clearly state the requisite quantum of proof, and while most 
lawyers dealing with this issue will be familiar with the 
summary judgment standard, an assumption of knowledge is a 
poor substitute for genuine clarity. Another problem with 
utilizing a procedural label in this context is that Internet 
defamation suits “may relate to actions filed in other 
jurisdictions, which may have different standards governing 
pleadings and motions; consequently, it could generate more 
confusion to define an obligation by referring to a particular 
motion procedure.”122 
3.  A Standard Requiring Plaintiffs to Make a Prima Facie Case 
of All Elements of a Defamation Claim Within Their Control 
Should Be Implemented. 
Requiring plaintiffs to make a prima facie case for each 
element of a defamation claim within their control is the 
quantum of proof that should be applied in John Doe 
defamation cases. This standard requires plaintiffs to meet a 
higher burden than either the “good faith” standard or the 
“motion to dismiss” standard, both of which offer inadequate 
First Amendment protections. The “prima facie” standard is 
also devoid of the confusing procedural terms that plague the 
“summary judgment” standard. By implementing a “prima 
facie” standard, the principal shortcomings of all of the existing 
standards would be alleviated. 
D.  A BALANCING TEST IS NECESSARY 
The last provision of the standards used in John Doe 
defamation cases about which there is debate is whether to 
include a balancing test at the end of the test, whereby a court 
would “balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of 
anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie 
case presented . . . .”123 In Doe v. Cahill, the court dismissed the 
balancing test as unnecessary because a balancing test would 
add “no protection above and beyond that of the summary 
judgment test and needlessly complicates the analysis.”124 
                                                          
 122. Id. 
 123. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001). 
 124. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005). 
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These objections do not outweigh the benefits of including a 
balancing test. Allowing a court to conduct a balancing of 
interests adds only minimal complexity to the overall test. As 
for the summary judgment test itself providing the balance, 
that conclusion fails to consider “whether balancing a broader 
range of competing interests is warranted.”125 Such broader 
interests that may need to be taken into account, but which 
would be neglected without a balancing test, include what type 
of speech is involved; the speaker’s expectation of privacy; the 
consequences unmasking the speaker will have, both on 
himself and on others; and the availability of other discovery 
methods.126 
V. A UNIFORM APPROACH IS NOT AS FAR AWAY AS IT 
MAY SEEM 
Many of the current interjurisdictional disagreements 
regarding John Doe defamation cases are differences that may 
be settled easily. While there is admittedly much disagreement 
about what quantum of proof to require,127 the other elements 
of the standard to apply when deciding to unmask an 
anonymous defendant are much less controversial. For 
example, several cases have required a notification provision.128 
However, most of the cases that failed to include a notification 
provision did not do it because they thought it was a bad idea—
they did it because they felt it was unnecessary.129 For 
example, in In re Does 1-10, the court declined to impose a 
notification provision, but the opinion never explicitly stated 
that a notification was a bad idea.130 In fact, the court in In re 
Does 1-10 adopts the standard used by the court in Doe v. 
Cahill,131 which contained a notification provision.132 
                                                          
 125. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See supra section II-B. 
 128. See supra section II-B. 
 129. E.g., In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). The court 
in Krinsky v. Doe did state that a requirement that a plaintiff post a notice in 
the same place where the allegedly defamatory material was posted that they 
are seeking to learn the anonymous defendant’s identity may be “unrealistic 
and unprofitable” in some circumstances, but the court did not object to the 
idea of general notification. Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008). 
 130. In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) 
 131. Id. at 822–23. 
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The requirement that the exact statements be set forth is 
another element that is not very controversial. The courts that 
have rejected it have done so mainly on the grounds that it is 
unnecessary.133 But, as with the notification provision, just 
because a step of analysis is not always necessary does not 
mean courts will find the requirement that the exact 
statements be included to be a bad idea. 
Even the most controversial aspect of developing a test for 
when to unmask anonymous defendants in John Doe 
defamation cases, i.e. which quantum of proof to use, is not as 
contentious as it might seem. The two highest courts to decide 
the issue, the Supreme Court of Delaware134 and the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin135 essentially agree on the standard . 
Although the court in Cahill called for a “summary judgment 
test”136 and the court in Lassa adopted a “motion to dismiss” 
standard,137 these are functionally equivalent because 
Wisconsin requires “particularity in the pleading of defamation 
claims.”138 
VI. A SUGGESTED UNIFORM APPROACH 
If implemented, the uniform approach advocated in this 
Note might look something like this: 
 
 First, the plaintiff must make a good faith effort to notify 
the defendant that plaintiff is seeking to learn his 
identity. 
 Second, in any motion to discover the identity of an 
anonymous defendant, plaintiff must state the exact 
statements that allegedly constitute actionable speech. 
 Third, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of each 
element of defamation that is in his control. 
 Finally, the court must balance the plaintiff’s right to 
                                                          
 132. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005), 
 133. Id. at 461 (explaining that if the court adopts a high enough 
evidentiary standard in John Doe defamation cases, in this instance a 
summary judgment standard, that evidentiary standard would subsume a 
requirement that the exact statements be set forth). 
 134. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
 135. Lassa v. Rongstad, 719 N.W. 2d 673 (Wis. 2006). 
 136. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461. 
 137. Lassa, 719 N.W.2d at 687. 
 138. Id. 
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relief against the defendant’s right to engage in 
anonymous speech. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The situation presented any time there is a John Doe 
defendant creates problems above and beyond the normal 
difficulties of bringing a suit. The entity bringing the suit 
obviously believes it was wronged or it would not be in court. 
However, the rights of the plaintiff must be balanced against 
the First Amendment rights of the John Doe defendant. When 
two opposing entities both have strong competing interests, it is 
difficult to strike a balance between them, and this difficulty is 
illustrated by the confused and contradictory development of 
case law on the subject. However, this Note suggests that an 
appropriate balance between the two rights can be achieved if 
the plaintiff is required to make a good faith effort to notify the 
defendant of the suit, to set forth the exact statements that 
allegedly constitute actionable speech, to make a prima facie 
case for all elements of the wrongful act allegedly committed 
that are within the plaintiff’s control, and the court concludes 
by balancing the rights of the plaintiff against the rights of the 
defendant. This test is free of confusing procedural terms and 
can be applied universally to jurisdictions that require only 
notice pleading in defamation cases (e.g. Delaware) as well as 
jurisdictions that require more “particularity in the pleading of 
defamation claims” (e.g. Wisconsin).139 Advocating the above-
described standard is the principal purpose of this Note. 
However, the only way uniformity, coherence, and finality will 
be brought to this area of the law is if the United States 
Supreme Court grants certiorari to a John Doe defamation 
case. 
 
                                                          
 139. Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis. 2006). 
